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Review, 817 P.2d 328 (Utah 1991). Morton International, Inc. v. 
Auditing Division of the Utah State Tax Commission, 814 P.2d 581 
(Utah 1991). Both of the identified issues involve questions of 
law which must be reviewed in accordance with the "correction of 
error" standard. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTE/RULE 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-67 (1975) is the 
determinative statute in this case. It is set forth in full in the 
Addendum hereto as Exhibit A. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Mr. Hansen seeks review of the Industrial Commission Order 
granting Respondent Salt Lake City's Motion for Review reversing 
the prior award of the Administrative Law Judge wherein he alleged 
entitlement to permanent, total disability compensation occasioned 
by his 1976 work-ending industrial accident. 
Course of Proceedings 
Mr. Hansen filed an application for permanent, total 
disability benefits occasioned by an industrial accident which 
occurred on May 21, 1976. Respondents alleged that Mr. Hansen 
failed to prove legal and medical causation and was thus not 
entitled to permanent, total disability benefits (R. at 36-38). A 
formal hearing before an Administrative Law Judge was held on April 
14, 1992 (R. at 46). 
Disposition Below 
On March 18, 1993 the Administrative Law Judge held that Mr. 
Hansen had demonstrated legal and medical causation and that his 
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symptoms and total disability status were the result of his 1976 
industrial injury (R. at 173). A Medical Panel was appointed to 
examine Mr. Hansen and to review his medical records. The Panel 
made certain determinations as to the Applicant's impairments and 
when they arose (R. at 110-126) . No objections to the Medical 
Panel report were filed by any party, and it was not contradicted 
by any other medical evidence contained in the file (R. at 188) . 
His claim for permanent, total disability benefits was granted in 
a thorough, 26-page Order of the Administrative Law Judge dated 
March 18, 1993. A copy of the Order is attached to the Addendum as 
Exhibit B. 
Respondent Salt Lake City filed a Motion for Review with the 
Industrial Commission on April 29, 1993 (R. at 201-219). On May 
13, 1994 the Industrial Commission entered an "Order Denying Motion 
for Review" although the substance of the Order, in fact, granted 
the Motion for Review. In doing so the Industrial Commission 
adopted all of the Findings of Fact of the Administrative Law 
Judge, but reversed the Administrative Law Judge's Conclusions of 
Law and Order, denying Mr. Hansen's claim of entitlement to 
permanent, total disability benefits (R. at 260-263). A copy of 
that Order is attached to the Addendum as Exhibit C. Mr Hansen 
challenges that final agency action in this Petition for Review. 
Statement of the Facts 
This case involves a claim for permanent, total disability 
benefits related to a May 21, 1976 industrial accident wherein Mr. 
Hansen sustain* injuries to his left knee and right foot. He was 
employed by Respondent Salt Lake City Corporation on the date of 
his injury and worked as a maintenance man and glazier at the Salt 
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Lake City Airport. Part of his responsibilities involved the 
installation of glass. On May 21, 1976 Mr. Hansen was unloading a 
crate of glass when the crate tipped over and the glass fell on him 
injuring his lower extremities (R. at 34). 
Mr. Hansen subsequently had surgery performed on his right 
ankle on May 21, 1976 and later had left knee surgery on September 
8, 1976 which were both related to his industrial accident (R. at 
173). When he attempted to return to work in mid-January 1977, he 
had some difficulty doing so, and approximately three weeks later, 
on February 4, 1977, while at work carrying a bundle of chain link 
fencing, his left knee and right foot gave way causing him to fall 
to the ground. He was unable to return to work thereafter (R. at 
174). 
Mr. Hansen testified that Salt Lake City terminated him 
because he was unable to perform the duties that were required of 
him at the Salt Lake Airport (R. at 174). Salt Lake City argued 
that they had sent him a letter directing him to the personnel 
office to see if other suitable work was available; however, that 
letter was sent to an incorrect address and there was no evidence 
either that he received that letter or that Salt Lake City offered 
Mr. Hansen any opportunity for re-employment or retraining (R. at 
174). 
On May 24, 1977 Dr. Edward Hayes, the orthopedic surgeon who 
performed Mr. Hansen's surgery, wrote a letter to Salt Lake City 
Corporation indicating that Mr. Hansen could possibly return to 
light duty work as of April 25, 1977 (R. at 588); however, no light 
duty work was available or offered to him at the airport by Salt 
Lake City ( R. at 174) . Mr. Hansen testified that he was unable to 
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perform the work he had done all of his life because of his left 
knee and right ankle injuries (R. at 174). His testimony was not 
challenged by any opposing nr contradictory evidence. 
On June 13, 1977 Mr. Hansen applied for Social Security total 
disability benefits (R. at 869-872) and on June 17, 1977 he also 
filed an Application for Hearing with the Industrial Commission 
seeking permanent, partial disability compensation (R. at 1) . From 
June 1977 through May 1978, Mr. Hansen was involved in processing 
his claims for Social Security disability benefits and additional 
workers compensation disability benefits. 
A hearing on his workers compensation claim was held on 
September 19, 1977 and on May 10, 1978, Mr, Hansen received a 
permanent, partial disability award based upon a 16% whole person 
rating by a Medical Panel (R. at 16) . 
Social Security initially denied Mr. Hansen's June 13, 1977 
application for total disability benefits finding that he was 
capable of doing light work; however, on October 31, 1977, he filed 
a Request for Reconsideration indicating that his movements were so 
restricted that he could not work (R. at 1021). On December 13, 
1977, tin Social Security Administration confirmed its earlier 
denial, and on January 27, 1978, Mr. Hansen filed a Request for 
Hearing which on May 31, 1978 resulted in his being awarded total 
disability benefits based primarily on the right ankle, with his 
left knee mentioned as an additional problem. The Social Security 
Administrative Law Judge relied a great deal on the testimony of a 
vocational expei I who found that Mr. Hansen did not have the 
residual functional capacity to perform substantial, gainful 
employment. Total disability benefits were awarded to him 
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retroactively to May 21, 1976, the date of his industrial accident 
(R. at 847-852). 
On January 11, 1983 Mr. Hansen's Social Security total 
disability benefits were temporarily discontinued on the basis that 
it was asserted that he was now capable of gainful activity. On 
March 7, 1983, he filed a Request for Reconsideration and on 
October 26, 1983 his benefits were reinstated and back-dated for a 
continuous award from the May 21, 1976 industrial injury date (R. 
at 847-852). 
Salt Lake City last paid workers compensation weekly benefits 
to Mr. Hansen in January 1983, although they have continued to pay 
for his medical treatment, including his prescriptions since then 
up to and including the present (R. at 84). 
Mr. Hansen filed his claim for permanent, total disability 
compensation on November 16, 1990 ( R. at 34) . Respondents did not 
present any evidence at the hearing with respect to Mr. Hansen's 
ability to work. He is now a 66-year old man with a ninth grade 
education who has no transferable skills and who has not worked 
since 1977, a period of almost 18 years. Respondents waived 
referral for a determination regarding his vocational 
rehabilitation potential (R. at 149), essentially stipulating to 
his unemployability. The matter was referred to a Medical Panel 
which found that Mr. Hansen had a 70% (whole person) permanent, 
partial impairment of which 16% was exclusively attributable to the 
industrial accident (R. at 110-126, 129-130). 
Following subsequent, substantial input by counsel for the 
parties, the Administrative Law Judge on March 18, 1993 adopted the 
findings of the Medical Panel as her own and concluded that the 
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"preponderance of the evidence shows that Mr. Hansen has been 
disabled since the date of his industrial injury, May 21, 1976, to 
the present: , " She ordered the payment of permanent, total 
disability compensation benefits to Mr. Hansen (R. at 170-196). 
The Respondents subsequently filed a Motion for Review with the 
Industrial Commission (R. at 201-220). 
On May 13, 1994, the Industrial Commission entered an Order 
entitled "Order Denying Motion for Review11 although the substance 
of the Order indicated, in fact, that the Motion for Review of Salt 
Lake City Corporation had actually been granted. In doing so, the 
Industrial Commission adopted all of the findings of the 
Administrative Law Judge, but reversed the Administrative Law 
Judge's conclusions and denied Mr. Hansen's claim for permanent, 
total disability compensation (R. at 260-263). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Industrial Commission failed to apply the workers 
compensation act liberally in favor of awarding benefits. In fact, 
the Industi : i a] Commission engaged in speculation ' • support a 
denial of benefits, and without any record support or meaningful 
reasoning or explanation for its position. 
Mr. Hansen is entitled to benefits under the "Odd-Lot" 
doctrine. This basis for benefits was not even addressed by the 
Industrial Commission. Respondents conceded that Mr. Hansen 
sustained an industrial injury, was not a suitable candidate for 
vocational rehabilitation or retraining and that he was and is now 
permanently and totally disabled. The burden then shifted to the 
employer to prove the 'existence of regular steady work which the 
employers can do taking into account his education, mental capacity 
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and age.' They have wholly failed to meet that burden. 
Finally, the Industrial Commission adopted all of the Findings 
of Fact of the Administrative Law Judge, but then entered 
Conclusions of Law which have no support in the Findings. The 
Findings of Fact as entered by the Administrative Law Judge and as 
adopted by the Industrial Commission compel the conclusion that Mr. 




THE WORKERS' COMPENSATION ACT IS TO BE APPLIED LIBERALLY 
IN FAVOR OF AWARDING BENEFITS AND ALL DOUBTS ARE TO BE 
RESOLVED IN FAVOR OF THE INJURED WORKER, 
Few principles of workers7 compensation law are as well 
established in this State as that workers7 compensation disability 
claims are to be liberally construed in favor of awarding benefits, 
and any doubts raised from the evidence are to be resolved in favor 
of the claim. Utah Courts have consistently reiterated this 
principle from 1919 to the present. Heaton v. Second Injury Fund, 
796 P.2d 676 (Utah 1990); State Tax Commission v. Industrial 
Commission, supra., J & W Janitorial Co. v. Industrial Commission, 
661 P.2d 949 (Utah 1983); Prows v. Industrial Commission, 610 P.2d 
1362 (Utah 1980); McPhie v. Industrial Commission, supra.; Baker v. 
Industrial Commission, 405 P.2d 613 (Utah 1965); Askrew v. 
Industrial Commission, 391 P.2d 302 (Utah 1964); M & K Corp. v. 
Industrial Commission, 189 P.2d 132 (Utah 1948); and Chandler v. 
Industrial Commission, 184 P. 1020 (Utah 1919). 
The Utah Supreme Court in Chandler, supra, discussed the 
proper construction of the Workers7 Compensation Act and the 
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underlying purposes of the Act, and stated as follows: 
We are also reminded that our statute requires that 
the statues of this state are to be liberally construed 
with a view to effect the objects of the statutes and to 
promote justice.' 
* * * * * * 
In this connection it must be remembered that the 
compensation provided for in the act is in no sense to be 
considered as damages for the injured employee or to his 
dependents in case death supervenes. The right to 
compensation arises out of the relation existing between 
employer and employee, and that the injury arises out of 
[or] in the course of the employment. Under such an act 
the costs and expenses of conducting the business or 
enterprise, including compensation for injuries to 
xemployees or other casualties, must be taxed to the 
business. The theory of the Compensation Act is that the 
whole cost and expense of conducting the business as 
aforesaid is added to the cost of the articles that are 
produced and sold, and hence, in the long run, such costs 
and expenses are borne by the public; that is, by the 
consumers of the articles produced. The purpose of such 
an act, therefore, is to protect the employee and those 
dependent upon him, and in case of his serious injury or 
death to provide adequate means for the support of those 
dependent upon him. In view, therefore, that in case of 
total disability or death of the employee his dependents 
might become the objects of public charity, such a 
calamity is avoided by requiring the business or 
enterprise to provide for such dependents, with the right 
of the employer to add the amount that is paid out to the 
cost of producing and selling the product of such 
business or enterprise. The beneficent purpose of such 
acts are therefore apparent to all, and for that reason, 
if for no other, should receive a very liberal 
construction in favor of the injured employee. We are 
all united upon the proposition that in view of the 
purposes of such acts, in case there is any doubt 
respecting the right to compensation, such doubt should 
be resolved in favor of the employee or his dependents as 
the case may be. Id. at 1021-1022. (Emphasis added) 
The Administrative Law Judge in rendering her Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law applied this vital rule of construction. 
Her Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law evidence a "liberal 
construction" and "resolution of doubt in favor of the claim". 
Unfortunately, the Industrial Commission on review ignored this 
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basic principal. 
Rather, whenever any doubt or uncertainty appears in the 
record, the Industrial Commission construed it against the injured 
employee by selectively referencing Mr. Hansen's medical records, 
highlighting a subsequent medical condition and virtually ignoring 
the significant and work-terminating injury to his lower 
extremities. In fact the Industrial Commission went to the extreme 
to construe the record against the claim. 
Although extensive proceedings were held before the Social 
Security Administration which subsequently made a finding of total 
disability, the Industrial Commission dismissed it on the unfounded 
assertion that "... the Commission does not know the underlying 
facts upon which the Social Security Administration made its award, 
whether those facts are supported by the evidence...." (R. at 9).1 
In light of the Industrial Commission's highly selective and 
prejudicial construction of the medical evidence, the absence of 
any conflicting lay, medical or disability evidence refuting Mr. 
Hansen's claim, the denial of permanent, total disability 
compensation, for the reasons set forth in greater detail below, is 
simply not supported by the record. 
In conclusion, the entire underlying basis of the Order is 
fundamentally flawed and is nothing more than a speculative, 
1
 Interestingly enough, the Industrial Commission acknowledges 
that under current law the commission would have been required to 
follow the "sequential decision making process of the Social 
Security Administration." No reasonable explanation is given why 
it did not - as the Administrative Law Judge in this case did -
follow that same process. In addition, the complete Social 
Security file consisting of 28 exhibits and totalling almost 200 
pages was a part of the record below, but the Industrial Commission 
Order failed to refer to it at all. 
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unsupported, inartfully drafted, cursory view of the evidence. The 
Industrial Commission's Order clearly does not evidence the "humane 
and beneficent purposes" required by Utah Workers Compensation law. 
The Order should be reversed due to this obvious conceptual flaw. 
II 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ERRED IN FAILING TO UPHOLD THE 
ORDER OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE AWARDING WORKERS 
COMPENSATION BENEFITS PURSUANT TO THE PROVISIONS OF THE 
UNIVERSALLY ACCEPTED "ODD LOT" DOCTRINE. 
Petitioner is also entitled to permanent, total disability 
benefits under the "odd-lot" doctrine. Professor Larson in his 
monumental treatise on workers' compensation reviewed this 
doctrine, as follows: 
Under the odd-lot doctrine, which is accepted in 
virtually every jurisdiction, total disability may be 
found in the case of workers who, while not altogether 
incapacitated for work, are so handicapped that they will 
not be employed regularly in any well-known branch of the 
labor market. The essence of the test is the probable 
dependability with which claimant can sell his services 
in a competitive labor market, undistorted by such 
factors as business booms, sympathy of a particular 
employer or friends, temporary good luck, or the 
superhuman efforts of the claimant to rise above his 
crippling handicaps. 2 Larson, The Law of Workmen's 
Compensation, § 57.51 at 10-164.24 (1989). (footnotes 
omitted). 
Pursuant to well-established Utah case-law, an injured worker may 
be found to be totally disabled if by reason of the disability 
resulting from the injury, he cannot perform work of the general 
character that he was performing when injured, or any other work 
which a person of his capabilities may be able to do or learn to 
do. Marshall v. Industrial Commission, 681 P.2d 208 (Utah 1984). 
Brundage v. IML Freight, Inc. , 622, P.2d 790 (1980). Clark v. 
Interstate Homes, Inc., 604 P.2d 937, 938 (Utah 1979). United Park 
11 
City Mines Co. v. Prescott, 393 P.2d 800, 801-02 (Utah 1964). 
Caillet v. Industrial Commission. 58 P.2d 760 (Utah 1936). Mr. 
Hansen clearly meets this standard for entitlement. 
There is no dispute, and Respondents readily concede, that Mr. 
Hansen sustained an industrial injury, was and is not a suitable 
candidate for vocational rehabilitation or retraining, and was and 
is permanently and totally disabled. Their only basis for dispute 
is whether Mr. Hansen's 1976 industrial injury was a significant 
enough "cause" of his unemployability. 
On January 27, 1978 the United States Department of Health and 
Human Services, Social Security Administration, determined that Mr. 
Hansen was totally disabled as of the date of his industrial injury 
and that he was not a viable candidate for rehabilitation. The 
Social Security total disability file confirms that Mr. Hansen's 
industrial accident was the precipitating and eventual cause of his 
inability to engage in substantial, gainful employment. 
As a result of the July 1, 1988 change in the Workers 
Compensation Code, the sequential evaluation process which the 
federal government utilized in reaching its decision concerning Mr. 
Hansen's permanent, total disability status, has been statutorily 
adopted as one which the Industrial Commission must similarly 
apply. Although not technically binding in this case, because 
Petitioner's industrial accident preceded those changes to Utah 
Code Annotated, Section 35-1-67 (1988), that finding is still 
persuasive, legally as well as factually. 
In order to fully appreciate the application of the "odd-lot" 
doctrine it is helpful to understand its development and the facts 
under which it has been found to apply. 
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A. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE "ODD-LOT" DOCTRINE. 
Perhaps the first case to discuss the concept of the "odd-lot" 
doctrine was the English case of Cardiff Corporation v. Hall, 1 KB 
1009 (1911): 
There are cases in which the burden of showing suitable 
work can in fact be obtained does fall up the employer. 
... [If]... the capacities for work left to him fit him 
only for special uses and do not ... make his powers of 
labor a merchantable article in some well known lines of 
the labor market ... it is incumbent upon the employer to 
shew that such special employment can in fact be obtained 
by him. .. [I}f the accident leaves the workman's labor 
in the position of an "odd-lot" in the labor market, the 
employer must shew that a customer can be found who will 
take it... 
Judge Cordozo very early in the history of workmen's 
compensation in the United States stated the policy for "Odd-Lot" 
determination, as follows: 
He was an unskilled or common laborer. He coupled his 
request for employment with notice that labor must be 
light. The Petitioner imposing such conditions is 
quickly put aside for more versatile competitors. 
Business has little patience with the suitor for ease and 
favor. he is the 'odd-lot7 man, the nondescript in the 
labor market. Work, if he gets it, is likely to be 
casual and intermittent...Rebuff, if suffered, might 
reasonably be ascribed to the narrow opportunities that 
await the sick and halt. (Emphasis added). Jordan v. 
Decorative Co.. 130 N.E. 635, 636 (N.Y. App. 1921). 
B. DEVELOPMENT OF THE "ODD-LOT" DOCTRINE IN UTAH, 
The "odd-lot" doctrine has been accepted and favorably applied 
by the Utah Courts. One of the first Utah cases applying the 
doctrine was Brundage v. IML Freight, Inc. et. a h , 622 P. 2d 790 
(Utah 1980). In Brundage, the Plaintiff had spent thirty years as 
a truck driver. In August 1975 he injured his back in a non-
industrial accident which led to surgery later that year. In 
October 1976 he had recovered sufficiently so he returned to his 
job as a truck driver. He subsequently re-injured his back at work 
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and in 1977 again underwent surgery on his back. Months later, 
however, he re-injured his back again and was unable to return to 
work thereafter. 
The Industrial Commission found Mr. Brundage suffered from an 
overall permanent, partial impairment of 3 0% (whole person) - half 
(15%) of which was attributable to the industrial accident and half 
(15%) of which was attributable to non-industrial causes. Mr. 
Brundage was awarded permanent, partial impairment benefits, but 
his claim for permanent, total disability was denied. 
In reversing the Industrial Commissions ruling regarding 
permanent, total disability, the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
In his treatise The Law of Workmen/s 
Compensation, Professor Arthur Larson states: 
'total disability7 in compensation 
law is not to be interpreted 
literally as utter and abject 
helplessness.... The task is to 
phrase a rule delimiting the amount 
and character of work a [person] can 
be able to do without forfeiting his 
totally disabled status. 2 Larson, 
The Law of Workmen's Compensation, § 
57.51 at 10-107. 
Consonant with the view expressed by Larson, 
this Court has adopted the following 
definition of total disability: 
This Court has recognized the 
principle that a workman may be 
found totally disabled if by reason 
of the disability resulting from his 
injury he cannot perform work of the 
general character he was performing 
when injured, or any other work 
which a [person] of his capabilities 
may be able to do or to learn to 
do. . . United Park City Mines Co., 
v. Prescott, 393 P.2d 800, 801-802 
(1964). 
Mr. Hansen testified and the Administrative Law Judge found 
that he could not continue to perform the work he was doing when 
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injured, and that a vocational rehabilitation expert had found him 
unsuitable for rehabilitation (R. at 191). 
The next important decision was Entwistle v. Wilkins, 626 P. 2d 
495 (Utah 1981)• Mr. Wilkins, who was 55 years old, sold trailers 
and other types of recreational vehicles for Entwistle, and he was 
required to travel throughout the west contacting dealers. In 1977 
he suffered an injury to his back when he slipped and struck his 
back on some large rocks while attempting to unhitch a trailer. He 
was off work for some time while undergoing physical therapy and 
later returned to work on a light duty basis, but was unable to 
continue working. In defining "total disability" the Utah Supreme 
Court stated that: 
...'total disability' does not mean a state of abject 
helplessness or that the injured employee must be unable 
to any work at all. The fact that an injured employee 
may be able to do some kinds of tasks to earn occasional 
wages does not necessarily preclude a finding of total 
disability to perform the work or follow the occupation 
in which he was injured. His temporary disability may be 
found to be total if he can no longer perform the duties 
of the character required in his occupation prior to his 
injury. Id at 498. (citations omitted). 
Mr. Hansen also falls within the purview and standard 
enunciated in Entwistle. 
The "odd-lot" doctrine was next considered in the monumental 
decision of Marshall v. Industrial Commission, 681 P.2d 208 (Utah 
1984) . The injured worker in that case was employed by Emery 
Mining Company as a maintenance mechanic in a coal mine. On 
January 25, 1980 while leaving the mine in a tractor-trailer, he 
was bounced up and down on the seat resulting in an injury to his 
back. After several months of conservative medical treatment, Mr. 
Marshall underwent surgery on his back, following which he was 
advised by his doctor that he could not return to work. Mr. 
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Marshall was 67 years of age at the time. 
The Industrial Commission awarded Mr. Marshall permanent, 
partial disability compensation finding that he had sustained a 10% 
(whole person) impairment due to the accident of January 25, 1980, 
and 15% (whole person) due to pre-existing conditions. However, 
the Industrial Commission denied his request for permanent, total 
disability stating the primary reason he was unable to return to 
work was his age. 
The Utah Supreme Court reversed the Industrial Commission 
ruling that Mr. Marshall was entitled to permanent, total 
disability benefits under the "odd-lot11 doctrine, defining 
permanent, total disability as follows: 
[A] workman may be found totally disabled if 
by reason of the disability resulting from his 
injury he cannot perform work of the general 
character he was performing when injured, or 
any other work which a man of his capabilities 
may be able to do or to learn to do... . Id. at 
211. 
* * * * 
Disability is evaluated not in the abstract, 
but in terms of the specific individual who 
has suffered a work-related injury. An injury 
to a hand would not cause the same degree of 
disability in a teacher, for example, as it 
would in an electrician. Thus, in assessing 
the loss of earning capacity, a constellation 
of factors must be considered, only one of 
which is the physical impairment. Other 
factors are age, education training and mental 
capacity. It is the unique configuration of 
these factors that together will determine the 
impact of the impairment on the individuals 
earning capacity. Id. at 211. (citations 
omitted). 
Some employees, however cannot be 
rehabilitated and even though not in a state 
of abject helplessness / can no longer perform 
the duties . . . required in [their] 
occupations] . ' These employees fall into the 
so-called /odd-lot' category... Whether or 
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not an employee falls into the odd-lot 
category depends on whether there is regular, 
dependable work available for the employee who 
does not rely on the sympathy of friends or 
his won super human efforts. Once the 
employee has presented evidence that he can no 
longer perform the duties required in his 
occupation and that he cannot be 
rehabilitated, the burden shifts to the 
employer to prove the existence of regular, 
steady work that the employee can perform, 
taking into account the employee's education, 
mental capacity and age. ... 'It is much 
easier for the [employer] to prove the 
employability of the [employee] for a 
particular job than for the [employee] to try 
to prove the universal negative of not being 
employable at any work.' Id. at 212-213. 
(citations omitted). (Emphasis added) 
Finally, the Court pointed out that the majority of odd-lot cases 
are concerned with employees whose work involved physical labor, 
were 50 years of age and older, and had moderate or little 
education - which is strikingly similar to Mr. Hansen's case here. 
The Respondent's have failed to appreciate this shift in 
burden and that they had the burden of proving the availability of 
other work for Mr. Hansen. Their only effort in this regard was a 
single letter which they sent to the wrong address. 
And finally, in Hardman v. Salt Lake City Fleet Management, 
725 P.2d 1323 (Utah 1986), the injured worker, who was sixty years 
old with a limited education and even more limited work background, 
suffered a fractured skull when a steel beam fell and stuck him on 
the head. He had surgery performed on his skull to relieve the 
pressure on his brain. A Medical Panel found that he had a 25% 
(whole person) permanent, partial impairment, 15% (whole person) of 
which was related to the industrial injury. He requested 
permanent, total disability benefits because of his medical 
impairment and other disability factors, such as his age and lack 
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of education or skills. He was awarded only permanent, partial 
disability compensation. 
The Utah Supreme Court reversed holding that once the 
Petitioner had demonstrated that he was not suitable for 
rehabilitation, "The burden shifts to the employer to prove the 
xexistence of regular steady work that the employee can perform' 
taking into account the Plaintiff's education, mental capacity and 
age." Id. at 1327. The Court went on to note that "... the record 
is devoid of concrete evidence that he was offered work of the 
general nature he had been performing." Id. at 1327. 
In conclusion, as a result of his industrial injury, Mr. 
Hansen no longer performed work of the general character he was 
performing when injured. A vocational rehabilitation expert in his 
Social Security disability claim testified that in 1978 he was 
disabled and incapable of being rehabilitated. Respondents even 
stipulated that Mr. Hansen was permanently and totally disabled. 
Mr. Hansen is, therefore, entitled to permanent, total disability 
benefits under the "Odd-Lot" doctrine. 
Ill 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ERRED IN ENTERING CONCLUSIONS 
OF LAW WHICH ARE UNSUPPORTED BY THE RECORD OR THE 
FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE WHICH IT 
ADOPTED IN THEIR ENTIRETY IN ITS ORDER. 
Despite the age of this claim, a large quantum of medical 
evidence in support of the claim, most of it contemporaneous with 
the injury, was presented totaling over 738 pages (R. at 288-
1026). To assist in the resolution of the medical issues, a 
Medical Panel was appointed which both examined Mr. Hansen and 
reviewed his medical records. The Medical Panel entered a detailed 
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report, the conclusions of which were not challenged by 
Respondents• 
On March 18,1992 the Administrative Law Judge entered detailed 
Findings of Fact which led to the inescapable conclusion that Mr. 
Hansen had demonstrated legal and medical causation, and that his 
totally disabling symptoms resulted from his industrial injury. 
The Industrial Commission in its Order Denying Motion for 
Review adopted, without modification, all of the Findings of Fact 
of the Administrative Law Judge. Although the Industrial 
Commission's Order has a section entitled "Discussion and 
Conclusions of Law", a review of that portion of the Order 
discloses that there is not a single, true Conclusion of Law 
contained in it. The Commission merely speculates that there may 
be another cause of his unemployability, but does not succinctly 
identify or logically analyze what evidence supports its views. 
Although the Administrative Law Judge does not specifically 
number her Findings of Fact, a careful reading of her decision 
reveals the following relevant Findings of Fact which were adopted 
by the Industrial Commission in its Order: 
1. Mr. Hansen sustained an industrial injury in the 
course and scope of his employment with Respondent Salt Lake City 
on May 21,1976 (R. at 173). 
2. Following his industrial injury, Mr. Hansen had 
right ankle surgery on May 21,1976 and left knee surgery on 
September 8,1976. He returned to work in mid-January 1977, assuming 
his normal work duties (R. at 173). 
3. On April 4,1977, Mr. Hansen sustained a second 
injury when, while carrying a bundle of chain link fencing, his 
19 
left knee and right foot gave way causing him to fall to the 
ground. He was unable to return to work after that injury (R. at 
174) . 
4. As a result of that injury Mr. Hansen sustained a 
16% permanent impairment of the whole person (R. at 188). 
5. On June 13,1977, Mr. Hansen applied for Social 
Security Disability benefits. Although the Social Security 
Administration initially denied his claim on the basis he was 
capable of doing light work, a hearing was subsequently held and he 
was awarded disability benefits based primarily on his right ankle 
and secondarily on his left knee and back conditions. A vocational 
expert found he did not have the residual functional capacity to 
perform substantial gainful employment, and benefits were awarded 
to begin as of May 21,1976, the date of his industrial injury (R. 
at 175-76). 
6. From August of 1978 through August of 1979, Mr. 
Hansen was seen by Dr. Herbertson for treatment of right ankle 
pain, back pain, left knee pain, right elbow pain and neck pain. 
Dr. Herbertson treated these conditions primarily with medication 
(R. at 176). 
7. In August 1979 Mr. Hansen began seeing Dr. Jonathan 
Home primarily for his left knee and right ankle, the areas of the 
body injured in the industrial injury. Dr. Home performed a 
second knee surgery on November 12,1979 and a second ankle surgery 
on March 10,1980. In September of 1980, Dr. Home assessed Mr. 
Hansen's impairments to the left knee and right ankle at 32% of the 
whole person (R. at 176) . 
8. Mr. Hansen filed a second Application for Hearing 
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with the Industrial Commission and the matter was again referred to 
a Medical Panel which found his impairments to be a total of 14% 
(whole person), slightly less than the 16% found by the original 
Panel. Additional impairment benefits were denied in the December 
31,1982 Order, but additional temporary total compensation was 
awarded related to the two surgeries performed by Dr. Home (R. at 
177) . 
9. Prior to the May 21, 1976 industrial injury there 
was no mention in Mr. Hansen's medical record of any prior injury 
to his right ankle. Subsequent to the industrial injury there are 
numerous entries reflecting medical treatment, including an 
impairment rating. Likewise, for the left ankle and left knee (R. 
at 178-181) . Mr. Hansen's back was injured when he was involved in 
a car accident in 1966, which resulted in five days of 
hospitalization; however no medical records were presented to the 
Medical Panel with regard to this injury. The record also reflects 
that on April 7, 1992 he fell in a grease pit and sustained a 
sprain of his lumbar sacral spine which resolved after several 
months of treatment. After May 21, 1976 there are various entries 
with regard to his back injury (R. at 181-183). 
10. A Medical Panel was appointed which concluded that 
Mr. Hansen's whole person impairments were as follows: 12% for the 
right ankle (all attributable to the May 21, 1976 accident) , 5% for 
the left knee (all attributable to the May 21, 1976 accident), 10% 
for the left ankle (all attributable to problems arising after the 
industrial accident), 10% for the low back (2.5% attributable to 
problems existing before the industrial accident and 7.5% 
attributable to problems arising after the industrial accident), 
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and 1% for macular degeneration (all attributable to problems 
arising after the industrial accident). Mr. Hansen's additional 
40% (whole person) impairment related to his pulmonary condition 
was wholly attributable to problems arising after the industrial 
accident (R. at 188). 
11. The Administrative Law Judge adopted the Findings 
of the Medical Panel and noted that "There have been no real 
objections to the Medical Panel findings and the Panel ratings are 
not seriously contradicted by any other medical evidence. 
Therefore, the Administrative Law Judge will use the Panel ratings 
to assess the Applicant's relative physical impairments and their 
impact on his permanent disability." (R. at 188). 
12. "The Administrative Law Judge presumes that neither 
of the Defendants (the Employer nor the Employers' Reinsurance 
Fund) contests that the Applicant is currently unable to return to 
any of his previous work and that he is currently not susceptible 
to rehabilitation. The Administrative Law Judge bases this 
presumption on the fact that no evidence has been presented with 
respect to the Applicant's ability to work at this time and on the 
fact that Defendants waived a referral for a determination 
regarding the Applicant's susceptibility to rehabilitation." (R. 
at 188). 
13. The main issue in this case is whether the 
Applicant's inability to work was caused by his 1976 industrial 
injury. 
...[I]n analyzing what is the cause of the 
permanent, total disability, the proper time focus is not 
necessarily on the Applicant's impairment status at the 
date of the hearing, but rather his impairment status at 
the date he discontinued working. Also, physical 
impairment alone is not the only relevant criteria for 
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determining what is causing an individual to be unable to 
work. 
* * * 
... The Applicant testified that his right ankle and 
left knee injuries on May 21, 1976 prevented him from 
doing the fairly heavy work that a glazier is required to 
perform. Therefore, when he was unable to return as a 
glazier for Salt Lake City Corporation in February 1977, 
and because he believed he could no longer perform this 
occupation, the Applicant proceeded to apply for Social 
Security Disability benefits at that time. The 
Administrative Law Judge feels that it is logical that 
the knee and ankle impairments prevented the heavy 
lifting, prolong standing and stooping required in glass 
installation. 
* * * 
Although logically it appears that return to work 
was not completely foreclosed as of 1977, it would be 
speculative to find the Applicant was susceptible to 
rehabilitation at that time. No concrete evidence has 
been presented to support this conclusion. 
* * * 
...there is simply insufficient evidence to show the 
Applicant was susceptible of rehabilitation in 1977. In 
1978, after hearing and testimony from a vocational 
expert, it was finally determined that the Applicant was 
disabled and entitled to Social Security disability 
benefits. 
* * * 
... the Administrative Law Judge would have to say 
that the preponderance of the evidence shows that the 
Applicant has been disabled since the date of his 
industrial injury, May 21, 1976 to the present. (R. at 
190-192). 
14. In addition, the Administrative Law Judge made this 
specific, significant finding: 
The Administrative Law Judge finds that the 
Applicant has been disabled since the industrial injury 
on May 21, 1976 and that the primary cause of this 
disability has been the industrial injury to the left 
knee and right ankle that were sustained on May 21, 1976. 
The Defendants have waived any referral to the Division 
of Rehabilitation, the Administrative Law Judge finds it 
is appropriate to make a final award of permanent, total 
disability benefits associated with the May 21, 1976 
23 
industrial accident (R. at 193). 
Although the Administrative Law Judge's specific Findings of 
Fact are compelling and lead inescapably to the conclusion that the 
Petitioner is permanently and totally disabled as a result of his 
1976 industrial accident, the Industrial Commission while adopting 
all of these Findings of Fact reaches a totally different 
conclusion citing the following four bases for reversal: 
A. 
The Social Security Determination. In response to the compelling 
nature of the Social Security Determination - and the extensive 
Social Security file in the record - which was heavily relied upon 
by the Administrative Law Judge, the Industrial Commission's Order 
specifically concluded as follows: 
In considering the issue of causation, 
the Commission notes that the Social Security 
Administration's determination that Mr. Hansen 
was disabled from work after the 1976 injury. 
However, the Commission does not know the 
underlying facts upon which the Social 
Security Administration made its award, 
whether those facts are supported by the 
evidence, or whether legal principles 
appropriate to workers' compensation were 
applied by the Social Security Administration 
in making its determination. For those 
reasons, the Commission does not place a great 
deal of reliance on the Social Security 
determination (R. at 260-261). 
There is simply no support in the record for this conclusion. 
The Industrial Commission did in fact know the underlying facts 
upon which the Social Security Administration made its award. The 
proceedings before the Social Security Administration were 
exhaustively recited by the Administrative Law Judge and were 
placed in evidence. The Commission had access to the entire Social 
Security file, totaling almost 200 pages and containing 28 exhibits 
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(R. at 157-169, 842-1026). 
Mr. Hansen was initially denied by the Social Security 
Administration, but was subsequently reassessed and awarded 
benefits, particularly after a vocational rehabilitation expert 
found that he was disabled and incapable of being retrained. There 
is no basis to believe that those facts are not supported by the 
evidence, and in fact there is no evidence in the record that at 
the time of the Social Security determination, there were any other 
disabling conditions. 
The Industrial Commission further does not identify what 
"legal principles appropriate to workers compensation" may not have 
been applied by the Social Security Administration in making its 
determination; however, it does acknowledge that the current 
version of Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-67 (1988) requires the 
Industrial Commission to follow the sequential decision-making 
process of the Social Security Administration. Although that 
provision was not mandatory on the date of Mr. Hansen's injury, it 
is compelling both factually and legally. The Industrial 
Commission's decision "not to place a great deal of weight" on the 
Social Security decision, is without any basis in fact, and is 
contrary to its adoption of the Administrative Law Judge's Findings 
of Fact reflecting and accepting the Social Security proceedings 
and findings. 
B. 
Permanent, Partial Impairment Rating. The Industrial Commission's 
Order specifically concluded as follows: 
The Commission also notes that Mr. Hansen 
received a 16% permanent partial impairment 
rating as a result of the 1976 accident. That 
impairment rating has never changed since his 
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industrial injury. It is insufficient to 
prove that the 1976 accident caused Mr. Hansen 
to be permanently and totally disabled (R. at 
261) . 
This alleged Conclusion merely begs the question. Mr. Hansen 
never claimed that his 16% permanent, partial impairment rating, 
standing alone, was sufficient to prove that he was permanently and 
totally disabled. Similarly, it is also not necessary for Mr. 
Hansen's impairment rating to have increased since his last rating 
in order for him to be found entitled to permanent, total 
disability. This is not a requirement of Utah Workers Compensation 
law. 
It is, however, significant to note that the Administrative 
Law Judge specifically found - and the Industrial Commission 
adopted the finding - that: 
Physical impairment alone is not the only relevant 
criteria for determining what is causing an individual to 
be unable to work. In determining whether an industrial 
injury causes permanent, total disability, the 
Administrative Law Judge finds it is appropriate to look 
at the time at which the Applicant discontinued working 
and then to determine what factor or factors (including, 
but not limited to physical impairment) caused the 
Applicant to discontinue his/her working status (R. at 
191) . 
This is a reflection of the Marshall, et al., legal standard. 
The Industrial Commission's isolation of the single factor of 
impairment is contrary to Utah law. The Industrial Commission's 
limited observation is simply insufficient to overcome the 
otherwise extensive and uncontroverted evidence contained in the 
record. 
C. 
Failure to Timely Claim Entitlement to Permanent, Total Disability. 
The Industrial Commission's Order specifically noted as follows: 
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Mr. Hansen filed two claims for workers' 
compensation benefits within a few years of 
the 1976 accident and thus was before the 
Commission twice, but neither time did he 
claim to be permanently and totally disabled 
(R. at 261). 
The Industrial Commission's Order also noted: 
The fact that Mr. Hansen waited 14 years to 
raise his claim does not reduce his burden of 
proof, or shift that burden of proof to his 
employer. Had he raised his claim earlier, 
both parties could have provided better 
evidence (R. at 261). 
Utah Workers Compensation law, for industrial accidents 
occurring prior to July 1, 1988, did not contain any statute of 
limitation for filing a workers compensation claim alleging 
entitlement to permanent, total disability benefits. Utah Code 
Annotated, Section 35-1-67 (1975). See, e.g., Mecham v. Industrial 
Commission, 692 P.2d 783 (Utah 1984) and Buxton v. Industrial 
Commission, 587 P.2d 121 (Utah 1978). Therefore, Mr. Hansen was 
not obligated to request permanent, total disability benefits 
immediately following his industrial accident, or any particular 
time thereafter, because there was no limitation period which 
required him to do so. The Industrial Commission's implication 
that his failure to request permanent, total disability benefits 
either when he filed his earlier two claims, or earlier than 14 
years after his industrial accident, somehow detracted from his 
position that his 1976 industrial accident caused his eventual 
unemployability is without merit - legally and factually. He was, 
simply put, not required to file within any particular time frame, 
and did not waive his eventual claim in any way by not filing until 
1990. 
The Industrial Commission's additional observation that "had 
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he raised his claim earlier, both parties could have provided 
better evidence" is ludicrous (R. at 261) (Emphasis added). This 
observation is nothing more than pure speculation, the lack of 
support of which underscores its obvious specious nature. 
And finally, it is significant to note that the Industrial 
Commission does not in any way indicate what this particular 
Conclusion of Law or gratuitous observation means or how it impacts 
analysis of the causation question. The subject is simply 
mentioned and dropped without explanation, and this Court should 
similarly treat the Industrial Commissions purported or implied 
basis for denial. 
D. 
Failure to Return to Work. The Industrial Commission's Order 
specifically noted as follows: 
Finally, the Commission notes that Mr. 
Hansen did not actually return to work after 
the 1976 accident. However, his failure to 
return to work may be attributable to reasons 
other than his injury and is therefore given 
little weight (R. at 61). 
This Conclusion of Law is also simply not supported by the 
Findings of Fact in the record. The Industrial Commission never 
suggests what other reasons the failure to return to work could be 
attributable to, opining merely that his inability to return to 
work could be attributable to some other cause. The Industrial 
Commission does not make a single Finding of Fact which would 
suggest that there is any other specific basis for Mr. Hansen's 
inability to return to work other than his industrial accident. 
Without more, this conclusion must fail. 
Although the Industrial Commission notes that Mr. Hansen was 
released for light duty work during 1977, and that sometime 
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thereafter he began suffering pulmonary problems, there is no 
medical evidence to suggest that Mr, Hansen's inability to work 
following his industrial injury was caused by anything other than 
his industrial accident: 
Shortly after his 1976 accident, Mr. Hansen 
began suffering pulmonary problems then [sic] 
other assorted medical problems, which have 
been appraised by a Medical Panel as much more 
significant and debilitating than his 
industrial injury (R. at 261) . 
Nowhere in the record is there any serious suggestion that Mr. 
Hansen ceased working because of pulmonary problems that first 
manifested themselves well after his industrial accident occurred 
and for which he subsequently sought surgery in the early 1980's. 
The cause-effect relationship is briefly related in the Industrial 
Commission Order without any further analysis or reasoning. 
Similarly, "other assorted medical problems" also referenced in the 
Industrial Commission Order are not detailed or analyzed. The 
conclusion that they were "appraised by a Medical Panel as much 
more significant and debilitating than his industrial injury" is 
similarly unsupported, unexplained and unreasoned. The simple fact 
of the matter is, the Conclusions of Law are without merit and are 
unsupported by the Findings of Fact entered by the Administrative 
Law Judge and adopted by the Industrial Commission. The Industrial 
Commissions Conclusions of Law are speculative, and speculation, 
without more, is simply insufficient to support the Industrial 
Commission's Order below. 
In conclusion, there is simply no evidence which can be 
marshaled, nor any findings made by the Administrative Law Judge or 
the Industrial Commission, which would support the conclusion that 
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Mr. Hansen has not established that his permanent, total disability 
was caused by his industrial accident. The failure to award him 
permanent, total disability benefits cannot be and is not supported 
by the record as a matter of law. 
CONCLUSION/STATEMENT OF RELIEF SOUGHT 
Based upon the foregoing it is respectfully requested that 
this Court reverse the decision of the Industrial Commission and 
enter an Order awarding permanent, total disability benefits to Mr. 
Hansen based upon: 
(1) the Findings of Fact entered by the Administrative 
Law Judge and adopted by the Industrial Commission; 
(2) the uncontroverted evidence contained in the record; 
and 
(3) the lack of any substantive evidence or legal 
analysis whatsoever referenced in the Industrial Commission's Order 
allegedly supportive of its final agency action. 
DATED this 17th day of January, 199£. 
VIRGTWTUS DABNEY,|ES{ 
Attorney for Petition* 
i 
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ADDENDUM 
EXHIBIT A: Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-67 (1975) 
EXHIBIT B: Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order of 
the Administrative Law Judge (March 18, 1993). 
EXHIBIT C: Order Denying Motion for Review of the Industrial 
Commission of Utah (May 13, 1994). 
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35-1-67. Permanent total disability—Amount of payments—Vocational 
rehabilitation—Procedure and payments.—In eases of permanent total dis-
ability the employee shall receive 662^9^' of bis average weekly wages at 
the time of the injury, but not more than a maximum of 85% of the state 
average weekly wage at the time of the injury per week and not less 
than a minimum of $45 per week plus $3 for a dependent wife and $5 for 
each dependent minor child under the age of eighteen years, up to a 
maximum of four such dependent minor children not to exceed the average 
weekly wage of the employee at the time of the injury, but not to exceed 
85% of the state average weekly wage at the time of the injury per week. 
However, in no case of permanent total disability shall the employer or 
its insurance carrier be required to pay such weekly compensation pay-
ments for more than 312 weeks; and provided further, that a finding by 
the commission of permanent total disability shall in all cases be tentative 
and not final until such time as the following proceedings have been had: 
Where the employee has tentatively been found to be permanently and 
totally disabled, it shall be mandatory that the industrial commission of 
Utah refer such employee to the division of vocational rehabilitation under 
the state board of education for rehabilitation training and it shall be the 
duty of the commission to order paid to such vocational rehabilitation 
division, out of that special fund provided for by section 35-1-68 (1), not 
to exceed $1,000 for use in the rehabilitation and training of such em-
ployee ; the rehabilitation and training of such employee shall generally 
follow the practice applicable under section 35-1-69, and relating to the 
rehabilitation of employees having combined injuries. If and when the 
division of vocational rehabilitation under the state board of education 
certifies to the industrial commission of Utah and in writing that such 
employee has fully co-operated with the division of vocational rehabilita-
tion in its efforts to rehabilitate him, and in the opinion of the division 
the employee may not be rehabilitated, then the commission shall order 
that there be paid to such employee weekly benefits at the rate of 662,4% 
of his average weekly wages at the time of the injury, but not more than 
a maximum of 85% of the state average weekly wage at the time of the 
injury per week and not less than a minimum of $45 per week plus $5 
for a dependent wife and $5 for each dependent minor child under the 
age of eighteen years, up to jt maximum of fou^ such dependent minor 
children not to exceed the average weekly wage of the employee at the 
time of the injury, but not to exceed 85% of the state average weekly 
wage at the time of the injury per week out of tha t special fund provided 
for by section 35-1-68 (1), for such period of time beginning with the 
time that the payments (as in this section provided) to be made by the 
employer or its insurance carrier terminate and ending with the death of 
the employee. No employee, however, shall be entitled to any such benefits 
if he fails or refuses to co-operate with the division of vocational rehabili-
tation as set forth herein.. 
EXHIBIT A 
Commencing July 1, 1971, all persons who are permanently and totally 
disabled and on that date or prior thereto were receiving compensation 
benefits from the special fund provided for by section 35-1-68 (1) shall 
be paid compensation benefits at the rate of $60 per week. 
Commencing July 1, 1975, all persons who were permanently and totally 
disabled on or before March 5, 1949, and were receiving compensation 
benefits and continue to receive such benefits shall be paid compensation 
benefits from the special fund provided for by section 35-1-68 (1) at a rate 
sufficient to bring their weekly benefit to $60 when combined with employer 
or insurance carrier compensation payments. 
The division of vocational rehabilitation shall, at the termination of 
the vocational training of the employee, certify to the industrial commis-
sion of Utah the work the employee is qualified to perform, and thereupon 
the commission shall, after notice to the employer and an opportunity to 
be heard, determine whether the employee has, notwithstanding such re-
habilitation, sustained a loss of bodily function. 
The loss or permanent and complete loss of use of both hands or both 
arms, or both feet or both legs, or both eyes, or of any two thereof, shall 
constitute total and permanent disability, to be compensated according to 
the provisions of this section and no tentative finding of permanent total 
disability shall be required in such instances; in all jfcther cases, however, 
and where there has been rehabilitation effected but where there is some 
loss of bodily function, the award shall be based upon partial permanent 
disability. 
In no case shall the employer or the insurance carrier be required to 
pay compensation for any combination of disabilities of any kind as pro-
vided in sections 35-1-65, 35-1-66 and this section, including loss of 
function, in excess of 85% of the state average weekly wage at the time 
of the injury per week for 312 weeks. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH 
Case No. 90001056 
* 
GERALD R. HANSEN, * 
Applicant, * FINDINGS OF FACT 
* 
VS. * CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
• 
SALT LAKE CITY CORPORATION * AND ORDER 
(Self-Insured) and EMPLOYERS * 
REINSURANCE FUND, * 
* 
Defendants. * 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
HEARING: Hearing Room 332, Industrial Commission of Utah, 
160 East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, on April 
14, 1992 at 1:00 o'clock p.m. Said hearing was 
pursuant to Order and Notice of the Commission. 
BEFORE: Barbara Elicerio, Administrative Law Judge. 
APPEARANCES: The applicant was present and was represented by 
Virginius Dabney, Attorney. 
The defendant, Salt Lake City Corporation (Self-
Insured), was represented by Ray Montgomery, 
Attorney. 
The Employers Reinsurance Fund was represented by 
Erie Boorman, Attorney/Administrator. 
This case involves a claim for permanent total disability 
benefits related to a May 21, 1976 industrial accident resulting in 
injuries to the applicant7s right ankle and his left knee. At the 
time of the hearing, the self-insured employer and the Employers 
Reinsurance Fund argued that the applicant was not entitled to 
permanent total disability benefits because the applicant's 
disabling condition was his non-industrial pulmonary obstruction 
and not the orthopedic problems that resulted from the industrial 
accident. The Employers Reinsurance Fund pointed out that the 
applicants orthopedic problems have remained static in the 16 
years since the industrial accident (or may have even improved), 
while the pulmonary problems have become more symptomatic. The 
applicant responded that he never returned to work after his trial 
re-employment in 1977 and that he was awarded Social Security 
ECHIBIT B 
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Disability with the onset date being the same date as the 
industrial accident date. The applicant also pointed out that he 
was 63 years old# had only a 9th grade education and had no 
transferable skills. He testified that he has not worked since 
1977 because his right ankle and left knee, in combination, prevent 
him from doing the physical work that he has done for a living all 
his life. 
Just prior to the hearing, the defendant/self--insured 
employer filed a hearing memorandum in which the employer argued 
the addtional defense that the applicant was barred from pursuing 
a permanent total disability claim for having failed to file an 
application for hearing with the Industrial Commission within 3 
years of the date of the last payment of compensation (last payment 
asserted by the employer to have been in January of 1983 with the 
application for hearing on the permanent total disability claim 
being filed in November of 1990). Counsel for the employer cited 
U.C.A. 35-1-99 for this statute of limitations. At hearing, 
counsel was provided with the citations for Mecham v. Industrial 
Commission, 692 P.2d 783 (Utah 1984) and Buxton v. Industrial 
Commission, 587 P.2d 121 (Utah 1978) as precedent for the 
proposition that there is no separate statute of limitations for 
permanent total disability claims once the initial filing 
requirements are met. However, counsel reasserted the U.C.A. 35-1-
99 3-year statute of limitations defense post-hearing in a letter 
to the ALJ dated April 24, 1992, indicating that he had reviewed 
the cited cases and found they were distinguishable from the 
instant case. In the same letter, counsel cites the 1990 amendment 
to U.C.A. 35-1-98, which does specify a 6-year statute of 
limitations for permanent total disability claims. 
Because the applicant has a history of a number of injuries 
and/or medical problems, after the hearing, the matter was referred 
to a medical panel to have the applicant's impairments rated and 
apportioned as to those existing prior to the industrial accident, 
those caused by the industrial accident and those developing 
subsequent to the industrial accident. The medical panel report 
was received on November 12, 1992 and was distributed to the 
parties on November 13, 1992, with 15 days allowed for objections. 
On November 30, 1992, counsel for the applicant submitted a letter 
to the ALJ requesting that the panel clarify when the applicant's 
pulmonary impairment occurred. The ALJ sent a letter to the panel 
chairman on December 1, 1992 requesting clarification and the 
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chairman responded in a letter received at the Commission on 
January 4, 1993. This clarification report was distributed to the 
parties on January 6, 1993, with an additional 15 days allowed for 
objections. 
On January 14, 1993, counsel for the applicant wrote the ALJ 
requesting a tentative finding of permanent total disability and 
requesting that the attorneys for the self-insured employer and the 
Employers Reinsurance Fund waive the statutorily mandated-referral 
to the Utah State Office of Education Division of Rehabilitation. 
Counsel renewed this request in another letter received at the 
Commission on January 25, 1993. On February 1, 1993, the ALJ 
received a letter from counsel for the employer indicating that no 
waiver was being made, because the employer felt that the 
industrial injury did not cause the applicant to be permanently 
totally disabled (primarily because the majority of the applicant's 
impairment was related to the non-industrial pulmonary condition). 
On February 22, 1993, the ALJ also received a letter from the 
Employers Reinsurance Fund which indicates that the Fund agreed 
with the employer that the permanent total disability was not 
caused by the industrial injury. Counsel for the applicant 
responded to the letters of the employer and the Employers 
Reinsurance Fund in a letter dated February 23, 1993, indicating 
that even before the development of the pulmonary condition, the 
Social Security Administration had found the applicant disabled as 
of the date of the industrial accident. 
On March 2, 1993, the ALJ wrote counsel for the employer and 
the Employers Reinsurance Fund requesting that they waive the 
statutory referral to the Division of Rehabilitation as logically 
it did not seem possible that the Division would attempt to offer 
rehabilitation to the applicant considering his age and long time 
unemployed status. The ALJ noted that she was not requesting a 
waiver of any of the defenses either party had asserted up to that 
point, merely just a waiver of the rehabilitation referral. On 
March 3, 1993 counsel for the Employers Reinsurance Fund provided 
the ALJ with a stipulation to waive the referral and on March 8, 
1993 counsel for the employer provided the ALJ with a stipulation 
to waive the referral. On March 11, 1993, counsel for the 
applicant filed another letter reiterating that the pulmonary 
problems were never considered by the Social Security 
Administration in awarding the applicant disability benefits and 
indicating that the applicant was awarded the benefits based on 
orthopedic problems that included the right ankle and left knee 
problems that were caused by the 1976 industrial injury at issue. 
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The matter was considered ready for a final order as of March 8, 
1993 when the ALJ received the final stipulation to waive the 
rehabilitation referral from the employer. 
FINDINGS OF FACT: 
The applicant is a male who was 47 years old on the date of 
injury, May 21, 1976, and who had a wife and one minor child as of 
that date. In school, the applicant completed the 9th grade and 
did attend the 10th grade for a part of a year. The applicant 
testified that he can read, but stated that his writing was 
somewhat illegible. The first employment that he can recall was 
when he drove a pick-up truck for United Supply Delivery. Right 
after that, the applicant started to work as a glazier and did this 
for the rest of his employment life. The applicant was employed 
with Salt Lake City Corporation on the date of injury, having been 
hired by Salt Lake City on March 2, 1971. The applicant worked as 
a maintenance man and glazier at the Salt Lake City Airport. The 
applicant plowed runways in the winter using heavy equipment and 
mowed lawns during the spring and summer. He operated other heavy 
equipment as well, including front end loaders, backhoes and 
graders. The applicant also was an experienced glazier and had 
worked as a glazier for Granite School District from May 1965 
through February 1971. Part of the applicants responsibilities at 
the Salt Lake City Airport was installing glass. The applicant was 
earning $950.00 per month as of the date of injury, or 
approximately $219.40 per week. On May 21, 1976, the applicant was 
unloading a crate of glass when the crate tipped over and the glass 
fell on the applicant, primarily effecting his right lower 
extremity. 
The applicant had surgery on his right ankle on May 21, 1976 
and later had left knee surgery on September 8, 1976, which was 
determined to be related to the industrial accident as well. 
Almost immediately after the surgery on the left knee, the 
applicant was hospitalized again for a pulmonary embolus. 
Approximately mid-January 1977, the applicant returned to work for 
Salt Lake City Corporation, apparently doing his normal work 
duties. The applicant recalls returning to work in December of 
1976, but the majority of the documentary evidence reflects a 
return to work on approximately January 13, 1977. On approximately 
February 4, 1977, the applicant was at work carrying a bundle of 
chain link fencing when his left knee and right foot gave way, 
causing him to fall to the ground. It is not clear whether or not 
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the applicant actually caused any aggravation to his left knee or 
right foot when this occurred, but he did not return to work after 
that injury. The applicant stated that the combination of problems 
with his left knee and right ankle caused him to be unable to walk 
and stand for any time, caused inability to lift greater than 25 
pounds and prevented him from bending and stooping. He testified 
that Salt Lake City told him that he was terminated because he was 
unable to perform the duties that were required of him at the Salt 
Lake City Airport. However, Salt Lake City presented a copy of a 
May 10, 1977 letter sent to the applicant indicating that he was to 
go to personnel to see what other jobs might be available to him. 
At hearing, it was determined that the letter was not sent to the 
applicant's proper home address and the applicant does not recall 
receiving the letter. 
On May 24, 1977, Dr. E. Heyes, the orthopedic surgeon that 
performed both the ankle and knee surgery following the industrial 
accident, wrote a letter to Salt Lake City Corporation indicating 
that the applicant could return to light duty work operating a 
motor vehicle as of April 25, 1977. However, the applicant 
testified that he was unable to operate a clutch vehicle due to his 
left knee and therefore was only able to drive a vehicle with an 
automatic transmission. The applicant testified at hearing that he 
could not really remember the events that transpired in mid-1977 
with respect to his failed return to work. He recalls only that he 
was unable to perform the work that he had performed all his life 
(presumably glass installation) because of the left knee and right 
ankle injuries and he recalls that there was no light duty 
available to him at the airport. 
On June 13, 1977, the applicant applied for social security 
disability and on June 17, 1977, the applicant filed an application 
for hearing with the Industrial Commission because he felt that the 
impairment ratings he had been given were inusfficient (Dr. Heyes 
had rated the ankle at 15% and the left knee at 5%, but his ratings 
were non-specific and thus it is unclear if he was rating the lower 
extremity or the whole person). From June of 1977 through May of 
1978, the applicant was involved in litigating both his claim for 
social security disability benefits and his claim for additional 
workers compensation impairment benefits. During this time, the 
applicant got no treatment for either his left knee or his right 
ankle. However, he did begin to see Dr. W. Hebertson during this 
period, in October of 1977, for back pain. 
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The Industrial Commission litigation: 
A hearing was held on September 19, 1977. The 
matter was referred to a medical panel for 
additional input with respect to what impairments 
resulted due to the industrial accident. The 
medical panel report was issued on March 21, 197'8 
and rated the right foot at 12% whole person and 
the left knee at 5% whole person, for-a total 
industrial impairment of 16% whole person. The 
panel concluded that the back problems and right 
elbow problems were not related to the May 21, 1976 
industrial accident. The panel report indicates 
that the panel relied on office notes of Dr. E. 
Heyes dated prior to the industrial accident for 
their conclusion that the right elbow problems pre-
existed the industrial accident. Those office 
notes are not included in the medical record 
exhibit (Exhibit A-l) presently being utilized for 
the instant litigation. On May 10, 1978, Findings 
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order were entered 
awarding the applicant temporary total compensation 
(TTC) from May 22, 1976 though January 12, 1977 and 
from February 4, 1977 through April 25, 1977 and 
awarding permanent impairment benefits based on the 
16% whole person rated by the panel. 
The Social Security Litigation: 
Responding to the applicants June 13, 1977 
application for disability benefits, Social 
Security denied the application on September 29, 
1977, stating that the applicant was capable of 
doing light work. On October 31, 1977, the 
applicant filed a request for reconsideration, 
indicating that his movement was so resticted that 
he could not work. He noted that the doctor had 
told him that he didn't want the applicant even 
looking for work and didn't want the applicant 
going to school until he was recovered. The 
applicant asserted that he could only walk with a 
cane and could do no lifting. On December 13, 
1977, Social Security again denied benefits, 
indicating that the applicant could still do 
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sedentary work and that his experience as a glazier 
resulted in him having transferable skills. On 
January 27, 1978, the applicant filed a request for 
hearing. On May 31, 1978, the applicant was 
awarded disability benefits based primarily on the 
right ankle and secondarily on the low back, with 
the left knee mentioned as an additional problem. 
Apparently, the Social Security ALJ relied a great 
deal on the testimony of a vocational expert who 
found that the applicant did not have the-residual 
functional capacity to perform substantial gainful 
employment. The benefits awarded were to begin as 
of May 21, 1976. 
From August of 1978 through August of 1979, the applicant 
saw Dr. Hebertson almost exclusively. Dr. Hebertson's office notes 
are brief and illegible and his periodic letters to Salt Lake City 
Corporation are very brief. Dr. Hebertson just lists the 
applicant's complaints in his letters and office notes and those 
include: right ankle pain, back pain, left knee pain, right elbow 
pain, and neck pain. Apparently, the only treatment provided by 
Dr. Hebertson was presciption medication. This medication included 
percodan or percocet (apparently at one point tylox was 
substituted), either dalmane, Seconal, nebutal or halcion, Valium, 
and varying combinations of rela, indocin or fiorinal. The 
frequency and amount of percodan or percocet was gradually 
increased during 1979 and 1980. By 1981, the amount prescribed was 
a regular and consistent 100 per month. This continued along with 
the other medications through 1988, when the the amount of 
percodan/percocet was reduced to 60 per month. The prescription 
refill notes continue in Dr. Hebertson's records through 1990. 
In August of 1979, the applicant began alternating his 
visits with Dr. Hebertson with visits to Dr. Jonathon Home. The 
applicant saw Dr. Home for his left knee and right ankle and per 
numerous indications in Dr. Horne/s notes, the applicant told Dr. 
Home that he could not take medication for his knee and ankle due 
to an ulcer problem. Dr. Home was thus under the impression that 
some other form of treatment was necessary. Dr. Home performed a 
second knee surgery on November 12, 1979 and a second ankle surgery 
on March 10, 1980. The applicant saw Dr. Home regularly, in 
between visits to Dr. Hebertson, through September of 1980. In 
September of 1980, Dr. Home rated the applicants impairment to 
the left knee and right ankle at 32% whole person (twice the amount 
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rated by the previous medical panel) and this prompted the 
applicant to file a second application for hearing with the 
Industrial Commission. The matter was again referred to a medical 
panel which rated the applicant's impairment at a total of 14% 
whole person (actually less than the 16% rated by the original 
panel). Additional impairment benefits were denied in the final 
order (issued on December 31, 1982) but additional temporary total 
compensation was awarded, apparently related to the two additional 
surgeries performed by Dr. Home. 
From October 1980 through March of 1982, the applicant 
alternated between seeing Dr. Hebertson for his presciptions and 
going to the VA Hospital for pulmonary related problems. In 
October of 1982, the applicants Social Security disabilty award 
came up for review and the applicant represented to Social Security 
at that time that he needed 2 canes to walk, that he didn't drive, 
that he needed assistance bathing and that he was unable to do 
anything physical. In connection with the review, Dr. Home issued 
a report in November of 1982 indicating that the applicant would 
need a right ankle arthrodesis within the next year or two because 
of increased arthritis in the foot joints. Dr. Home noted that 
the applicant's foot was likely to get worse and that the applicant 
could only walk one block before he experienced severe pain in the 
foot. Dr. G. Zeluff did an examination and analysis of the 
applicant's condition in December of 1982, apparently at the 
request of Social Security. His report sates that he felt the 
applicant's complaints were out of proportion to his examination 
findings. He noted that there was only minimal degenerative 
changes in the back, right ankle and left knee. Dr. Hebertson also 
did a report for Social Security in December of 1982 and just lists 
the applicant's complaints as: right chest soreness, low back pain, 
right foot pain, pain and swelling in the left knee, intrascapular 
pain, arthritic finger pain and headaches. Dr. Hebertson notes 
that he had done no range of motion testing, had taken no X-rays 
and had done no inquiry with respect to the applicant's activity 
restrictions. 
On January 11, 1983, the applicant's Social Security 
benefits were discontinued. The decision to discontinue benefits 
notes that the applicant was able to do substantial gainful 
activity as of January of 1983, It was noted that the applicant's 
breathing capacity was "O.K." and that his loss of range of motion 
in the ankle, head and back was only moderate, with no loss of 
range of motion in the left knee. The arthritis in the left knee 
and right ankle was determined to be moderate and it was decided 
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that the applicant could use his hands and arms without 
restricition. It was noted that the applicant could walk 
adequately and that he could perform light work. Transferable 
skills were found to exist. On March 7, 1983, the applicant filed 
a request for reconsideration and on October 26, 1983, benefits 
were reinstated. The reinstatement decision indicates that a 
combination of problems caused the applicant to be disabled. 
Specifically noted was the applicants arthritis, secondary to his 
orthopedic problems. It was determined that the arthritis caused 
incapacitating pain. The applicant's residual functional capacity 
was determined to be at the sedentary level, with the applicant 
having no transferable skills. The applicant's advanced age, and 
his minimal education were also noted. Benefits were awarded 
continuous from May 21, 1976. 
From March of 1983 through May of 1985, the applicant saw 
Dr. Hebertson primarily for his prescriptions, with only an 
occasional visit to Dr. Home. In August of 1983, a Dr. R. Daynes 
wrote the applicant after examining him and stated that it was 
advisable for the applicant to reduce his daily percodan intake as 
well as his alcohol intake. Beginning in June of 1985, the 
applicant saw only Dr. Hebertson through August of 1987. The 
applicant continued to see Dr. Hebertson only through August of 
1990, except that he had continuing visits to the VA Hospital for 
his pulmonary problems. 
III. Specific Problems: 
In order to make it easier for the medical panel to assess 
the impairments, the ALJ presented the panel with the following 
list of specific problems noted in the medical records, with a 
breakdown based on what problems surfaced prior to the industrial 
accident and which became apparent only after the industrial 
accident. 
A. RIGHT ANKLE: 
1. Prior to May 21, 1976 - no mention made in medical 
records 
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2. After May 21, 1976 -
5-21-76 SURGERY - by Dr. E. Heyes at St. Mark's Hospital 
- Procedure: repair of laceration of posterior 
deltoid ligament 
2-4-77 slip and fall when applicant attempted return to 
work - treated by Dr. Heyes 
9-1-77 continuing problems described by Dr. D. Loken as 
pain in the foot and ankle except if the 
applicant walked on the lateral border of the 
foot, with numbness in the heel, and swelling of 
the ankle - rated at 10% (non-specific with 
respect to lower extremity or whole man) 
3-21-78 Industrial Commission medical panel rates the 
ankle at 12% whole person 
9-19-79 Dr. J. Home attempts treating ankle with a short 
leg walking cast - this apparently is helpful 
with the applicant supposedly telling Dr. Home 
that he was able to run up or down stairs by 
October of 1979 
12-19-79 Dr. J. Home tries using a leather brace to treat 
the ankle and indicates that the applicant may 
someday need a fusion - the ankle brace does not 
improve the applicant's symptoms 
2-11-80 Dr. J. Home does an X-ray of the ankle and notes 
increased bone chips 
3-10-80 SURGERY - by Dr. J. Home at Cottonwood Hospital 
- Procedure: arthrotomy and excision of bone 
spurs of fibula and talus - in follow-up, by 4-80 
Dr. Home notes that the applicant is able to 
walk with a flat foot, but aching still is 
present 
6-7-80 CT scan done at Western Neurological Associates 
is read to show the only abnormality to be soft 
tissue calcifications just below the lateral 
malleous 
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6-23-80 Dr. J. Home notes that the ankle still swells 
and has pain and he rates the ankle at 30% of the 
lower extremity 
6-28-82 Dr. J. Home lists the diagnosis for the ankle as 
subtalar joint arthritis and mild recurrent spurs 
in the fibula/talar joint - he tries treating the 
arthritis with feldene 
11-17-82 Industrial Commission medical panel rates the 
ankle at 19% of the lower extremity (8% whole 
person) and finds that a fusion may be necessary 
in the distant future 
11-29-82 Dr. J. Home tells Social Security that the 
applicant will need an arthrodesis of the ankle 
in the next year or two due to increased 
arthritis in the foot joints 
B. LEFT ANKLE 
records 
1. Prior to May 21, 1976 - no mention made in medical 
2. After May 21, 1976 -
11-24-84 the applicant is seen at Cottonwood Hospital for 
a left ankle sprain - Dr. Home follows-up with 
at short leg cast and the injury is apparently 
resolved by December of 1984 when the cast is 
removed 
C. LEFT KNEE 
records 
1. Prior to May 21, 1976 - no mention made in medical 
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2. After May 21, 1976 -
9-8-76 SURGERY by Dr. E. Heyes at St. Marias Hospital -
Procedure: arthrostomy followed by arthrotomy and 
medical menisectomy 
9-1-77 Dr. D. Loken describes continuing problems as 
numbness in the lateral aspect, with the knee 
giving out when weight is placed on it - it is 
noted that the applicant needs to hold on to 
something when he is going upstairs - Dr. Loken 
rates the knee at 5% of the lower extremity 
3-21-78 Industrial Commission medical panel rates the 
knee at 5% whole person 
11-12-79 SURGERY by Dr. J. Home at Cottonwood Hospital -
Procedure: 1) arthroscopy, 2) debridement of 
chondromalacia (patella), 3) debridement of 
chondromalacia (medial femoral condyle) 4) 
lateral fasciotomy - Post-operative diagnosis: 
severe chondromalacia of patella medial femoral 
condyle left knee, scarred superpatellar synovial 
band left knee 
6-23-80 Dr. J. Home notes that the knee still swells and 
is painful -he rates the knee at 20% of the lower 
extremity 
11-17-82 Industrial Commission medical panel rates the 
left knee at 14% of the lower extremity or 6% 
whole person - the panel finds that a joint 
replacement may be necessary in the distant 
future 
D. BACK 
1. Prior to May 21, 1976 -
1966 per the applicant's testimony, he was involved in 
a car accident in 1966 which resulted in the need 
for 5 days of traction in the hospital 
(Cottonwood Hospita) - medical records for this 
incident are not included in the current medical 
record exhibit 
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4-7-72 Dr. J. Home notes that the applicant fell in a 
grease pit and landed on his left hip - this 
caused the applicant to twist his low back and 
bruise the left iliac crest - diagnosed as a 
sprain/strain of the lumbosacral spine, doubted 
herniated nucleous pulpous - treated with 
percodan, robaxin and a lumbosacral corset -
apparently resolved after several months of 
seeing Dr. Home - unclear if this accident is 
the same one mentioned by the applicant at 
hearing in which he fell backwards and hit his 
low back (about 2 inches above the tailbone) on a 
concrete edge 
2. After May 21, 1976 -
4-1-77 Dr. D. Loken notes that the back pain began about 
February or March of 1977 (around the time that 
the applicant fell with the chain link fence upon 
attempting to return to work after the industrial 
accident of 5-21-76) - Dr. Loken notes no 
neurological findings and no X-ray findings 
9-27-77 Dr. E. Heyes writes Social Security and indicates 
that the applicant felt that the back pain he was 
having was due to his limping - D. Heyes notes 
that this is possible 
10-17-77 Dr. Hebertson notes that the applicant may have 
twisted his back when he was carrying the chain 
link fence at work around February 4, 1977 
1-78 through 5-78 
Dr. Hebertson makes repeated notations 
that the applicant needs to have a myelogram -
apparently this is never done 
1-17-83 Dr. Home notes that the applicant has had back 
pain on and off since the 1966 car accident - he 
notes no neurological findings and normal 
reflexes, range of motion, sensation and power -
Dr. Home's diagnosis is: 1) mild degenerative 
changes, narrowing at L5-S1, 2) mild herniation 
or possible herniation at L5-S1 and 3) chronic 
sprain/strain of lumbosacral spine 
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5-1-85 the applicant sees Dr. Home regarding back pain 
E. RIGHT ELBOW: 
1. Prior to May 21, 1976: 
3-21-78 the medical panel report of this date indicates 
that the panel had office notes of Dr. E. Heyes 
varifying a right elbow condition treated by Dr. 
Heyes prior to the industrial accident - these 
office notes are not included in the present 
medical record exhibit 
2. After May 21, 1976: 
6-8-77 SURGERY by Dr. E. Heyes at St. Mark's Hospital -
Procedure: exploration and partial division of 
annular ligament 
9-1-77 Dr. D. Loken finds that the right elbow has 
minimal symptoms at this point 
F. LEFT ELBOW: 
1. Prior to May 21# 1976: 
6-8-70 Dr. J. Home notes that the applicant had a left 
elbow contusion while fishing 
2. After May 21, 1976: 
4-2-86 Dr. J. Home notes that the applicant fell on his 
left elbow 
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G. PULMONARY PROBLEMS: 
1. Prior to May 21, 1976: 
3-14-72 a chest X-ray at St. Mark's Hospital (apparently 
taken while the applicant was an inpatient for an 
ulcer) shows some findings 
5-21-76 while the applicant is hospitalized at St. Mark's 
Hospital for his right ankle industrial injury, 
the records note that the applicant had pneumonia 
in 1974 leaving right lower lobe scars - the 
records also note that the applicant is being 
followed by Dr. Abaunza for repeated shortness of 
breath 
2. After May 21, 1976: 
9-13-76 through 9-21-76 
the applicant is hospitalized at St. Mark's 
Hospital for chest pain and a suspected pulmonary 
embolus and is treated by Dr. K. Ritchie with 
anti-coagulants 
10-14-80 the applicant is seen at the VA Hospital for a 6-
week cough - it is noted that the applicant is a 
40-50 pack year smoker 
10-22-80 through 11-13-80 the applicant is hospitalized at 
the VA Hospital for an abnormal mass seen on a 
chest X-ray - the applicant undergoes a number of 
procedures including: 1) a bronchoscopy on 10-24-
80, 2) a rigid brondchoscopy and right middle and 
right lower lobectomy on 10-31-80 - the discharge 
diagnosis is: endobrachial hamartoma, right lower 
lobe 
1-7-81 the applicant is seen at the VA Hospital for an 
upper respiratory tract infection 
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2-24-81 the applicant is seen at the VA Hospital for 
post-surgical thoracic pain which is treated with 
an intercostal block injection and elavil 
3-22-81 the applicant is seen at the VA Hospital for 
chest wall pain 
4-25-81 the applicant is seen at the VA Hospital for 
pleural effusion 
5-81 the applicant is seen at the University Hospital 
Pain Clinic for difficulty managing the post-
surgical chest pain 
5-19-81 the applicant is seen at the VA Hospital for 
acute bronchitis 
3-7-92 the applicant is seen at the VA Hospital for 
chest wall pain 
11-17-82 the Industrial Commission medical panel finds 
that the applicant's respiratory problems are due 
to a tumor which may have been present as early 
as the date of injury (5-21-76) but is unrelated 
causally to the industrial accident 
3-7-85 the applicant is seen at the VA Hospital as a 
result of upper respiratory tract infections with 
sharp chest pain in December of 1984 and January 
of 1985 
12-22-87, 12-29-87 and 1-9-88 
the applicant is seen at the VA Hospital for 
chronic obstructive pulmonary disease and/or 
chronic bronchitis 
9-26-88 pulmonary fucntion tests are done at the VA 
Hospital and it is determined that the applicant 
has moderate obstruction 
11-5-88 the applicnat is seen at the VA Hospital for 
chest pain - an EKG is read as normal - follow-
ups occur on 11-22-88 and 11-28-88 
1-24-89 the applicant is seen at the VA Hospital for an 
increase in his chronic shortness of breath 
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3-7-89 pulmonary function tests are done at the VA 
Hospital and it is again determined that the 
applicant has moderate obstruction 
3-29-89 through 4-5-89 
the applicant is an in-patient at the VA Hospital 
due to chronic obstructive pulmonary disease -
follow-up occurs on 5-30-89 
6-10-89, 7-19-89, 7-21-89 
the applicant is seen at the VA Hospital due to 
acute exacerbations of his chronic obstructive 
pulmonary disease 
H. HEADACHES 
1. Prior to May 21, 1976: 
1947 the applicant is struck in the head by a hoist 
cable while unloading a boat while he was in the 
military - the applicant recalls that he had loss 
of conciousness, possibly for more than one day, 
and he develops periodic headaches thereafter 
2. After May 21, 1976: 
12-80 the applicant is seen at the VA Hospital for 
syncope, dizzy spells and nausea and an acoustic 
neuroma is ruled out - extensive testing occurs 
8-14-87 the applicant is seen at the VA Hospital for 
headaches which is noted to be related to a head 
trauma in the service - it is noted that the 
headaches have increased over the last few years 
and that the headaches are associated with 
photophobia 
9-3-87 the applicant is seen at the VA Hospital in 
follow-up on his headaches and elvavil is 
prescribed 
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I. PSYCHIATRIC 
1. Prior to May 21, 1976: 
1964 the applicant is voluntarily committed to a 
hospital in California - the applicant testified 
that he was there for 2 months and received 
therapy and medication during his stay - per the 
applicant'& testimony, he was depressed and had 
put his fist through a wall prior to his 
admission without provocation 
2. After May 21, 1976: 
5-81 though 7-81 the applicant is taught relaxation 
techniques at the VA Hospital to deal with his 
post-surgical chest pain -the applicant is also 
given amitriptylline 
Briefly mentioned in the medical records or testimony were 
several things that developed prior to May 21, 1976. The applicant 
was hospitalized (at St, Mark's Hospital) in March of 1972 for an 
ulcer problem and Dr. W. Hebertson did a consult during this 
hospital stay for hand/arm numbness that the applicant was 
experiencing. The applicant also had some neck problems associated 
with the back injury that he had in the 1966 car accident. Dr. 
Hebertson lists neck complaints occasionally in his list of 
symptoms that he was treating with "drug therapy." The applicant 
also had some vision impairment prior to the industrial accident 
which the applicant contends is verified by the 4-6-76 report of 
Dr. Quinn that is attached to the top of the medical record 
exhibit. In addition, the applicant states that he feels that his 
hearing got gradually worse after he got out of the service and 
thus he feels that he had some hearing loss at the time of the 
industrial accident, but there are no medical records regarding his 
hearing dated prior to the industrial accident. 
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The medical panel consisted of Dr. M. Thomas, a neurologist, 
Dr. W. Hess, an orthopedist and Dr. R. Burgoyne, a psychiatrist. 
The panel concluded that the applicant's whole person impairment 
was as follows: 12% for the right ankle (all attributable to the 5-
21-76 accident), 5% for the left knee (all attributable to the 5-
21-76 accident) , 2% for the left ankle (all attributable to 
problems arising AFTER the industrial accident), 10% for the low 
back (2.5% attrtibutable to problems existing BEFORE the industrial 
accident and 7.5% attributable to problems arising AFTER the 
industrial accident) and 1% for the applicant's macular 
degeneration (all attributable to problems arising AFTER the 
industrial accident). The panel found that the applicant had 0% 
permanent impairment related to the following problems noted in the 
medical records: right elbow status post division of annular 
ligament, somatoform pain disorder and thinking disorder (in 
remission), and headahces. Per the clarification report submitted 
by the panel at the ALJ's request on January 4, 1993, the 
applicant's 40% whole person impairment related to the pulmonary 
condition (status post-partial pneumonectomy for hamartoma with 
COPD, moderate impairment, stable) was wholly attributable to 
problems arising AFTER the industrial accident. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
Preliminary Conclusions: 
The ALJ adopts the findings of the medical panel with 
respect to the applicant's impairment ratings and the indications 
as to when the impairments arose. There have been no real 
objections to the panel findings and the panel ratings are not 
seriously contradicted by any other medical evidence. Therefore, 
the ALJ will use the panel ratings to assess the applicant's 
relative physical impairments and their impact on his permanent 
disability. The ALJ presumes that neither defendant (the employer 
nor the Employers Reinsurance Fund) contests a finding that the 
applicant is currently unable to return to any of his previous work 
and that he is currently not susceptible to rehabilitation. The 
ALJ bases this presumption on the fact that no evidence has been 
presented with respect to the applicant's ability to work at this 
time and on the fact that the defendants have waived a referral for 
a determination regarding the applicant's susceptibility to 
rehabilitation. 
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Statute of Limitations: 
The ALJ finds that the applicant is not barred from claiming 
permanent total disability benefits due to the 3-year filing 
requirement in U.C.A. 35-1-99, as it read on the date of the 
applicant's industrial injury, or due to the 1990 amendment to 
U.C.A. 35-1-98, as counsel for the employer has argued. The ALJ 
finds that the 1990 amendment to U.C.A. 35-1-98 (specifying a 6-
year statute of limitations for permanent total disability claims) 
is not applicable, because that amendment was enacted 14 years 
after the applicant's date of injury. The employer has provided no 
explanation regarding why this amended version of U.C.A. 35-1-98 
should apply to this case, and thus the ALJ will simply follow the 
well established principal that the law as of the date of injury is 
the correct law to apply. Although the ALJ finds that the U.C.A. 
35-1-99 provision cited by counsel for the employer was the law at 
the time of the applicant's injury, the ALJ finds that case law 
narrowly limits the application of that 3-year filing requirement 
so that it does not bar the applicant's claim in this case. 
The Mecham case cited at the beginning of this order is 
factually almost identical to this case. In that case, the 
applicant had a 1961 injury which was litigated at the Industrial 
Commission from 1964 through 1966. Pursuant to that litigation, 
the applicant was awarded benefits for a permanent partial 
impairment only. The last payment of compensation was made in 
December of 1964. It was not until December of 1982, that the 
applicant formally filed a claim for permanent total disability 
benefits with the Commission. The claim was dismissed by the ALJ 
because the claim was filed more than 3 years after the last 
payment of compensation. The Supreme Court reversed this ruling, 
noting that the applicant had met the 3-year filing requirement, 
because reports were filed just after the date of injury by the 
employer and the applicant's physicians. The Court found that the 
filing of these reports created jurisdiction for the Commission and 
that to determine if there was any further time limits for filing, 
one had to consult the particular statute dealing with the kind of 
benefits being claimed (in the case of permanent total disability 
benefits, the particular statute is U.C.A. 35-1-67). The Court 
found that U.C.A. 35-1-67 contained no separate time limit for 
filing a permanent total disability claim and thus the 18 year time 
lapse between the last payment of compensation and the 1982 filing 
with the Commission did not act as a bar to the applicant's 
permanent total disability claim. 
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The ALJ does not understand why counsel for the employer 
feels that the Mecham case is not on point. One need only change 
the dates and the facts are almost identical. Absent some better 
explanation from counsel as to why he feels the Mecham case is 
inapplicable, the ALJ must conclude that the Mecham case is the 
ruling precedent on the applicability of the U.C.A. 35-1-99 3-year 
statute of limitations to the instant case. Based on the Court's 
ruling in Mecham, the applicant in the instant case met the 3-year 
filing requirement back in 1976 when reports were filed with the 
Commission and thus he does not need to again meet the requirement 
after the last payment of compensation in order to file a permanent 
total disability claim. Based on this ruling, the ALJ will proceed 
to decide the merits of the applicant's claim for permanent total 
disability benefits. 
The Cause of the Permanent Total Disability: 
The main issue in this case is whether the applicant's 
inability to work has been caused by the 1976 industrial injury. 
Counsel for the employer has cited the cases Large v. Industrial 
Commission. 758 P.2d 954 (Utah App. 1988) and Hodges v. Western 
Piling & Sheeting Co. , 717 P.2d 713 (Utah 1986) for the proposition 
that an award of permanent total disability benefits can only be 
made where it is the industrial injury that causes the disability 
(as opposed to a situation where an industrial injury occurs, but 
some other factor or condition causes the disability). The ALJ 
agrees that these two cases stand for the proposition that there 
must be some causal link between the industrial injury and the 
inability to work. 
Both the employer and the Employers Reinsurance Fund have 
argued that, currently, the applicant's most disabling condition is 
his respiratory condition. Certainly, the 40% whole person rating 
that the panel has assessed for that condition makes it clear that 
the respiratory impairment is the most significant impairment that 
the applicant has currently. However, in analyzing what is the 
cause of the permanent total disability, the proper time focus is 
not necessarily on the applicant's impairment status at the date of 
hearing, but rather his impairment status at the date that he 
discontinued working. Also, physical impairment alone is not the 
only relevant criteria for determining what is causing an 
individual to be unable to work. In deterining whether an 
industrial injury causes permanent total disability, the ALJ finds 
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that it is appropriate to look at the time at which the applicant 
discontinued working and then to determine what factor or factors 
(including, but not limited to physical impairment) caused the 
applicant to discontinue his/her working status. 
Unfortunately, the absence of a separate statute of 
limitations for permanent total disability claims allows for 
significant time delays between the discontinuance of work and the 
filing of a permanent total disability claim. These time delays in 
turn cause the employer or carrier to be unable to perform any 
meaningful discovery with respect to the cause of the 
discontinuance of work. This certainly has occurred in this case. 
Because the applicant discontinued working in 1977 and did not file 
a permanent total disability claim until late 1991, information 
regarding what was happening in 1977 for the applicant is very 
sparse. In addition, in this particular case, this lack of 
information is compounded by the fact that the applicant recalls 
very little about why he discontinued working and what efforts he 
made, or could have made, to continue working in 1977. Finally, 
clearly the statute anticipates that there will be some efforts at 
rehabilitation once an injured employee determines he is unable to 
return to his prior employment because of a job injury. However, 
at this point, the defendants and the Division of Rehabilitation 
cannot even attempt to offer rehabilitation, because the applicant 
has developed a post-injury significant respiratory condition, 
because he is now nearly retirement age, and because he has not 
worked for the past 16 years. 
Based on the foregoing concerns, the ALJ does not feel that 
she has very accurate information on which to make a determination 
as to what caused the applicant to discontinue working in 1977. 
Nevertheless, the ALJ must look at what information there is and 
make this determination. The applicant testified that his right 
ankle and left knee injuries on May 21, 1976 prevented him from 
doing the fairly heavy work that a glazier is required to perform. 
Therefore, when he was unable to return as a glazier for Salt Lake 
City Corporation in February 1977, and because he believed he could 
no longer perform this occupation, the applicant proceeded to apply 
for Social Security Disability benefits at that time. The ALJ 
feels that it is logical that the knee and ankle impairments 
prevented the heavy lifting, prolonged standing and stooping 
required in glass installation work. However, there is certainly 
some indication in the medical records that the applicant might 
have been able to perform some other kind of work, nothwithstanding 
the knee and ankle impairments, in 1977. Dr. Heyes suggested that 
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the applicant could be a driver and the applicants initial 
applications for Social Security Disability benefits were denied 
because it was determined that he could still do light work. 
Whereas rehabilitation currently is certainly untenable, in 1977 
the applicant might have been able to return to some kind of work 
had he sought or been offered some minimal new training. 
Although logically it appears that return to work was not 
completely foreclosed as of 1977, it would be speculative to find 
that the applicant was susceptible to rehabilitation at that time. 
No concrete evidence as been presented to support this conclusion. 
Of course, as noted above, the long wait to file for permanent 
total disability benefits is the primary cause of the lack of 
concrete evidence on this point. However, regardless of the 
reason, there simply is insufficient evidence to show the applicant 
was susceptible to rehabilitation in 1977. In 1978, after hearing 
and testimony from a vocational expert, it was finally determined 
that the applicant was disabled and entitled to Social Security 
Disability benefits. It is interesting that the applicant was 
initially denied continued disability benefits in 1983 when the 
Social Security Administration reassessed the applicant's 
disability status. Once again, it was asserted that by the Social 
Security Administration that the applicant was capable of light 
work, but in the final analysis, the applicant again was determined 
disabled and his benefits were reinstated so as to be continuous 
from the date of the industrial injury on. Based on the minimal 
evidence available (primarily the Social Security Disability 
records), the ALJ would have to say that the preponderance of the 
evidence shows that the applicant has been disabled since the date 
of his industrial injury, May 21, 1976, to the present. 
The only remaining question is whether the past 16 years of 
disability have been caused by the May 21, 1976 industrial 
accident. Once again, per the most relevant evidence available, 
the Social Security Disability records reflect that the disability 
benefits paid during this period were based on the applicants 
orthopedic problems, including the right ankle and left knee 
impairment (solely attrtibutable to the industrial injury per the 
medical panel) as well as the low back (wholly non-industrial per 
the panel). There is no way of knowing whether the non-industrial 
back impairment alone would have been a sufficient basis for 
awarding the Social Security benefits. Although it is not 
completely clear why the ankle and knee problems are always listed 
first on the determination synopsis sheets, it may be that these 
were found to be the more significant problems. The panel did rate 
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the left knee and right ankle combined somewhat higher than the 
back. In addition, there is very little mention of the back 
problems in the medical records and very little treatment for the 
back during the past 16 years. More attention has been paid to the 
left knee and right ankle, per the medical records. Therefore, 
based on the scant information available, the ALJ finds that the 
primary cause of the applicant's disability during the past 16 
years has been the left knee and right ankle impairments sustained 
in the May 21, 1976 industrial accident. 
In conclusion, the ALJ finds that the applicant has been 
disabled since the industrial injury on May 21, 1976 and that the 
primary cause of this disability has been the industrial injuries 
to the left knee and right ankle that were sustained on May 21, 
1976. As the defendants have waived any referral to the Division 
of Rehabilitation, the ALJ finds it is appropriate to make a final 
award of permanent total disability benefits associated with the 
May 21, 1976 industrial accident. 
Benefits Due: 
Prior Industrial Commission orders were entered on May 10, 
1978, awarding the applicant $6,737.15 in temporary total 
compensation and $5,158.23 in permanent impairment benefits, and on 
December 31, 1982 awarding the applicant $1,785.24 in additional 
temporary total compensation. The compensation rate used in both 
of those orders was $148.77/week. The ALJ presumes that the 
amounts awarded in these orders, a total of $13,680.61, constitutes 
the full payment that has been made by Salt Lake City Corporation 
on the May 21, 1976 industrial accident. Salt Lake City's, 
liability for permanent total disability amounts to 312 weeks at 
the maximum rate for permanent total disability benefits in May 
1976 ($131.75), or a total of $41,106.00. Of that amount 
$27,425.39 remains to be paid ($41,106.00 - $13,680.61). That 
amount is accrued and due and payable in a lump sum, plus interest 
and less the attorney fees to be adressed below. The Employers 
Reinsurance Fund's liability for continuing benefits begins at the 
conclusion of the initial 312 weeks or on January 30, 1983 (using 
a start date February 5, 1977, the day following the last date of 
work). The Employers Reinsurance Fund is to pay benefits at 
$131.75 per week, or at the minimum rate for permanent total 
disability applicable if that is higher. 
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Attorney fees are based on the benefits generated by the 
attorney in the first 312 weeks per Commission rule R568-1-7, or 
$27,425.39. Per the rule, the attorney fees are $3,000.00 (20% of 
the first $15,000.00 generated) + $1,8631.81 (15% of the remainder 
if it is less than $15,000.00, as it is in this case, $12,725.39 x 
.15) or a total of $4,863.81. 
ORDER: 
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the defendant, Salt Lake City 
Corporation (Self-Insured), pay the applicant, Gerald Hansen, 
permanent total disability benefits, at the rate of $131.75 per 
week, for 312 weeks, or a total of $41,106.00, for the permanent 
total disability resulting from the May 21, 1976 industrial 
accident. That amount is accrued and due and payable in a lump 
sum, less the $13,680.61 paid to date, plus interest at 8% per 
annum, per U.C.A. 35-1-78, and less the attorney fees to be awarded 
below. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendant, Salt Lake City 
Corporation (Self-Insured), pay all medical expenses incurred as 
the result of the May 21, 1976 industrial accident; said expenses 
to be paid in accordance with the medical and surgical fee schedule 
of the Industrial Commission of Utah. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the defendant, Salt Lake City 
Corporation (Self-Insured), pay Virginius Dabney, attorney for the 
applicant, the sum of $4,863.81, plus the percentage of interest 
that is appropriate per R568-1-7, for services rendered in this 
matter, the same to be deducted from the aforesaid award to the 
applicant, and to be remitted directly to the office of Virginius 
Dabney. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Administrator of the Employers 
Reinsurance Fund shall prepare the necessary vouchers directing the 
State Treasurer, as Custodian of the Employers Reinsurance Fund to 
place the applicant, Gerald Hansen, on the Employers Reinsurance 
Fund payroll as of Janaury 30, 1983, with payments to be made to 
him at the rate of $131.75 per week, or at the minimum applicable 
rate if that is higher. Said payments to the applicant should 
continue for the remainder of his life or until further notice from 
the Commission. Accrued payments are due and payable in a lump 
sum, plus interest at 8% per annum, per U.C.A. 35-1-78. 
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IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the 
foregoing shall be filed in writing within thirty (30) days of the 
date hereof, specifying in detail the particular errors and 
objections, and, unless so filed, this Order shall be final and not 
subject to review or appeal. 
Barbara Elicerio 
Administrative Law Judge 
Certified by the Industrial Commission 
of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah, this 
{?*& day of ^>7]^^TA „ ,1993. 
ATTEST: 
^Q^x,i^(f? 
Patricia O. Ashby 
Commission Secretar" 
^>1 
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MOTION FOR REVIEW 
Case No. 90-1056 
Mr. Hansen alleges that on May 21, 197 6, he became totally and 
permanently disabled because of an industrial injury suffered while 
employed by Salt Lake City. The ALJ awarded permanent total 
disability benefits to Mr. Hansen. Salt Lake City then filed this 
Motion For Review, challenging the ALJ's decision on a number of 
different grounds. Because the Commission concludes that Mr. 
Hansen has failed to establish that his industrial accident in 1976 
caused his now-claimed permanent total disability, the Commission 
does not specifically address the other points raised by Salt Lake 
City. 
The Industrial Commission of Utah exercises jurisdiction over 
this Motion For Review pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-12, Utah 
Code Ann. §35-1-82.53 and Utah Admin. Code R568-1-4.M. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
The Commission adopts the findings of fact set forth in the 
ALJ's decision. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Under Utah's Workers Compensation Act, Mr. Hansen is entitled 
to permanent total disability compensation only if he proves that 
his 1976 injury caused his now-claimed permanent total disability. 
See Utah Code Ann.§ 35-1-67(1); also Large v. Industrial 
Commission, 758 P.2d 954, 956 (Utah App. 1988). Other issues 
regarding Mr. Hansen's claim are not reached unless he first 
satisfies the threshold causation requirement. Zupon v. Industrial 
Commission, 860 P.2d 960 (Utah App. 1993). 
In considering the issue of causation, the Commission notes 
the Social Security Administration's determination that Mr. Hansen 
was disabled from work after the 1976 injury. However, the 
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Commission does not know the underlying facts upon which the Social 
Security Administration made its award, whether those facts are 
supported by the evidence, or whether legal principles appropriate 
to workers' compensation were applied by the Social Security 
Administration in making its determination. For those reasons, the 
Commission does not place a great deal of reliance on the Social 
Security determination.1 
The Commission also notes that Mr. Hansen received a 16% 
permanent partial impairment rating as a result of the 1976 
accident. That impairment rating has never changed since his 
industrial injury. It is insufficient to prove that the 1976 
accident caused Mr. Hansen to be permanently and totally disabled. 
Finally, the Commission notes that Mr. Hansen did not actually 
return to work after the 1976 accident. However, his failure to 
return to work may be attributable to reasons other than his injury 
and is therefore given little weight. 
Other facts exist which indicate Mr. Hansen's 1976 accident 
did not cause permanent total disability. Mr. Hansen's treating 
physician released him to return to light duty work during 1977. 
Mr. Hansen filed two claims for workers' compensation benefits 
within a few years of the 1976 accident and thus was before the 
Commission twice, but neither time did he claim to be permanently 
and totally disabled. Shortly after his 1976 accident, Mr. Hansen 
began suffering pulmonary problems then other assorted medical 
problems, which have been appraised by a medical panel as much more 
significant and debilitating than his industrial injury. 
As noted above, Mr. Hansen claims that his 1976 industrial 
injury caused permanent total disability as of 1976. The fact that 
Mr. Hansen waited 14 years to raise his claim does not reduce his 
burden of proof, or shift that burden of proof to his employer. 
Had he raised his claim earlier, both parties could have provided 
better evidence. Be that is it may, the Commission must make its 
decision based on the evidence that is available now. In view of 
the record before it, the Commission concludes that Mr. Hansen has 
failed to prove his 1976 industrial injury caused his now-claimed 
permanent total disability. 
While the current version of Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-67 specifically refers to the "sequential 
decision making process of the Social Security Administration", no such provision existed in Utah 
law at the time of Mr. Hansen's injury. 
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ORDER 
Based on the foregoing, the Commission denies Mr. Hansen's 
claim for permanent total disability compensation. It is so 
ordered. 
Dated this /?) "day of May, 1994. 
'Ctflleen S. Colton 
Commissioner 
NOTIFICATION OF APPEAL RIGHTS 
Any party may ask the Commission to reconsider this Order by 
filing a Request for Reconsideration with the Commission within 2 0 
days of the date of this Order. Alternatively, any party may 
appeal this Order to the Utah Court of Appeals by filing a Petition 
For Review with that Court within 3 0 days of the date of this 
Order. 
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Virginius Dabney 
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350 South 400 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Ray L. Montgomery 
Assistant City Attorney 
451 South State, Suite 505 
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